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I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Roe described himself to his interviewers. "Square,
loner-not with crowd."' If he could live his life over, he would "eat
less fast, be instantly likeable and charming, [and] lose 20 pounds."'
Mr. Roe trusted the interviewers and opened up to them, even giving
* J.D. summa cum laude, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center, 1991.
1. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360
So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) [hereinafter "Schellenberg"], rev'd sub
nor. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980)
[hereinafter "Byron Harless"].
2. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 90.
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unflattering opinions of his own son.3 After all, the lawyers for the in-
terviewers had promised him complete confidentiality. The lawyers
were wrong.5
Every word he said to his interviewers and every document he
shared with them, including his psychological test results, could poten-
tially become public.' It made no difference that Mr. Roe submitted
the details of his life to the consulting firm, Byron, Harless, Schaffer,
Reid & Associates [hereinafter "Byron Harless"], along with a letter
saying it was "absolutely essential" that the information be kept se-
cret.7 In that letter, he told Byron Harless that he could be fired from
his current job if it were to become publicly known that he was inter-
ested in a new job.' Moreover, the public revelation of intimate private
facts could "decrease ... [his] effectiveness as a witness in hearings
related to regulatory matters at the federal, state and local level." 9
Unfortunately for Mr. Roe, he was being screened by the private
consulting firm as a candidate for a job with an agency of the State of
Florida-executive director of the Jacksonville Electric Authority
[hereinafter "JEA"]. In Florida, the documents generated by private
firms doing business with a government agency sometimes, by law, be-
come public records. The documents telling Mr. Roe's life story fell
into that category.
State agencies often contract for private enterprises to act on their
behalf. Private institutions often spend public tax dollars. There is no
limit to the number of ways the government, in the business of govern-
ance, entangles itself with the private sector. Hence, the public some-
times has a right of access to documents in the hands of private-sector
businesses, charitable institutions and individuals when they perform
services for the government or spend the government's money.
This article sets forth the law in Florida on the public's right of
access to the documents of private-sector actors pursuant to Chapter
119, Florida Statutes, the Florida Public Records Act. The subject of
the article is closest to the hearts of the media and government lawyers
who frequently must define the right of reporters to inspect documents
3. Id.
4. Id. at 87.
5. Byron Harless, 379 So. 2d at 640-41.
6. id.
7. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 90.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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in the news-gathering process, but a far broader range of lawyers
would be well advised to familiarize themselves with the subject.
The legal advisors for the JEA and Byron Harless, for instance,
undoubtedly learned a bitter lesson when the provisions of Chapter
119, Florida Statutes, were applied to force the public release of many
of Byron Harless's records on Richard Roe and other unsuspecting can-
didates. 'Today, any time attorneys in Florida represent a business en-
terprise contemplating a government contract, they should discern in
advance whether any of their client's formerly proprietary internal doc-
uments might become subject to mandatory public disclosure'0 to any
person who asks for them, regardless of that person's identity or
motive."
Unfortunately, as this article concludes, the Florida court cases
are inconsistent in defining whether, and when, documents generated
by private actors are "public records." In some circumstances, the pub-
lic's right of access is clear. In others, the cases have-not articulated a
workable standard for determining whether the public has a right of
access. The law therefore is badly in need of clarification.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
In its first sentence, Chapter 119 states: "It is the policy of this
state that all state, county, and municipal records shall at all times be
open for a personal inspection by any person."' 2 This sweeping declara-
tion of legislative intent creates a presumption in favor of disclosure. 3
Every government record is subject to public inspection and copy-
ing "' unless it is specifically exempt by statute, and any statute creating
10. See id. at 87. Similarly, the confidentiality expectations of private parties
were dashed in Times Publishing Co. v. St. Petersburg, 558 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text, after counsel for the city
and the Chicago White Sox went to great lengths to avoid being subject to the Public
Records Act.
11. FL.A. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1991) (records open for personal inspection "by any
person"); News-Press Publishing Co. v. Gadd, 388 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
12. FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1991).
13. E.g., Sarasota Herald-Tribune Co. v. Community Health Corp., 582 So. 2d
730, 732 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Mills v. Doyle, 407 So. 2d 348, 350 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct, App. 1981).
14. The right to make copies of records follows from the right to inspect them.
FLA. STAT. § 119.07(l)(a) (1991) ("the custodian shall furnish a copy"); FLA. STAT. §
119.08(1) (1991) ("[in all cases where . . . any person interested has a right to in-
19921 1231,
3
Rivas: Access To "Private" Documents Under the Public Records Act
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
an exemption is narrowly construed."5 Chapter 119 contains specific ex-
emptions for: 1) certain police investigative and intelligence-gathering
materials," 2) the identities of confidential informants,' 3) the ques-
tions and answer sheets of licensing examinations,"8 and 4) various
other categories of documents. Scores of other exemptions are scattered
throughout Florida Statutes.' 9
Circuit courts are given the power to enforce the law by ordering
the release of documents wrongly withheld."° Any public records case
must be given scheduling priority over other cases before the court.2 ' If
a plaintiff prevails in obtaining public records, the court is to order
costs and attorney's fees to be paid by the agency even if the agency
spect ...any public record, . . any person shall hereafter have the right of access
...for the purpose of making photographs of the same"). In his experience as a jour-
nalist, the author occasionally encountered a state official who conceded the right to
inspect a particular document freely and take notes about it, but attempted to disallow
its photocopying. It is unlawful to refuse to allow photocopying of any record required
to be disclosed. Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Dep't, 352 So. 2d 1230,
1232 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The alternative would be absurd. There is
surely no reason to disallow photocopying if a person could read the document, tran-
scribe it verbatim and circulate every word publicly; or if indeed every member of the
public, including, specifically, those from whom the agency prefers to keep the docu-
ment secret, could go to the agency and inspect the document. FLA. STAT. §
l19.07(l)(a)-(b) (1991) sharply limits the fees an agency may charge for copies.
15. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979).
16. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.011, 119.07 (1991).
17. Id. § 119.07(3)(e) (1991).
18. Id. § 119.07(3)(c) (1991).
19. E.g., pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 240.299(4) (1991), all records of State Uni-
versity System-certified "direct-support organizations," which are fund-raising founda-
tions for the nine state universities, are exempt from Chapter 119 except the annual
audit, management letter, and any supplemental data supplied to the Board of Regents.
Special interests have obtained new enactments of such exemptions every year. By
1991, the Government-In-The-Sunshine Manual, updated annually by the Office of the
Attorney General and published by the First Amendment Foundation, contained 83
pages of fine print listing exemptions scattered throughout the Florida Statutes; the
previous year's edition contained 26 fewer pages. The Manual may be ordered by call-
ing the First Amendment Foundation, (904) 222-3518. In 1985, responding to the
growing list of such exemptions, the Florida legislature enacted the Open Government
Sunset Review Act, which automatically repeals every exemption from Chapter 119
every 10 years unless the continuation of the exemption is "compelled" by a restrictive
list of criteria in FLA. STAT. § 119.14((2) (1985). For a thorough review of the debate
on exemptions, see Barry Richard & Richard Grosso, A Return to Sunshine: Florida
Sunsets Open Government Exemptions, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 705 (1985).
20. FLA. STAT. § 119.11(1) (1991).
21. Id.
1232 [Vol. 16
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acted in a good faith but with the mistaken belief that the documents
were exempt from public disclosure.22
Suppose a person asks for a file of documents and the agency ref-
uses to provide it. This person need not search through all of the Flor-
ida Statutes to determine for himself whether the agency had a lawful
basis to refuse to produce the file. Chapter 119, Florida Statutes re-
quires the agency, on his demand, to explain what statutory exemption
the agency is relying on to withhold the file, and why the agency thinks
the file is covered by the cited exemption.23 If some of the documents in
the file are not exempt, the agency must produce those documents, and
cite a statutory exemption covering the others.24
The question of whether a document is exempt from public disclo-
sure arises only after a determination that the document is one of the
"records" of an "agency" within the meaning of the Public Records
Act. 5 For purposes of the act, "public records" includes "documents
22. Id. § 119.12 (1991); News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Palm Beach County, 517
So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). An exception to the attorney fee require-
ment, created in Fox v. News-Press Publishing Co., 545 So. 2d 941, 943 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989), is particularly relevant to this article. A private entity was the subject
of a public: records demand. The private entity filed suit for a declaratory judgment
seeking guidance on whether it had to comply with the News-Press's public records
demand. The court held that access to the records was not "unlawfully" denied be-
cause: 1) the recipient of the records demand was not an "agency," and 2) it filed suit
promptly to seek judicial guidance; therefore, attorney's fees were not assessed. See
also PHH Mental Health Services, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 582 So. 2d 1191 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991). News media have been joined by the attorney general in
lobbying the legislature to change the law to eliminate the Fox loophole. Letter from
Gregg D. Thomas of Holland & Knight, Tampa, Florida to Media Lawyers Through-
out the State (Jan. 4, 1991) (specifically explaining Fox; proposing legislative change;
claiming attorney general's support; seeking additional support); Letter from Patricia
Riste Gleason, Assistant Attorney General to Gregg D. Thomas (Dec. 18, 1990) (con-
firming attorney general's support; proposing revisions to section 119.12(1)) (copy en-
closed with Thomas' letter to media lawyers).
23. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (1991); Fox, 545 So. 2d at 942.
24. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (1991); Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075,
1078 (Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom., DePerte v. Tribune Co., 471 U.S. 1096
(1985).
25. A "public record" is a "public record" regardless of whether it is exempt
from disclosure. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1)-(2) (1991). This article focuses on whether
the records of a private-sector actor are within the "definitional reach" of the Public
Records Act. See Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 87-88. If the records of a private actor
are "within the definitional reach," they might nonetheless be kept confidential because
of an exemption from Chapter 119's requirement of disclosure. There are hundreds of
exemptions, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, any one of which might cover
1992] 1233
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* . . made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection
with the transaction of official business by any agency."26 An "agency'
includes any unit of government at the state or local level "and any
other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or
business entity acting on behalf of any public agency.'"27 The latter
clause, first enacted into the law in 1975,8 swept private-sector entities
under the coverage of the Public Records Law. However, when is a
private person or business "acting on behalf of any public agency?"
The answer to that question is elusive.
III. THE SEMINAL CASE: BYRON HARLESS
Predictably, private business enterprises resist the idea that their
proprietary records are "public records," and hence subject to all the
mandates of Chapter 119. In Shevin v. Byron Harless, Schaffer, Reid
& Assocs., 2 a private consultant claimed that the law was an unconsti-
tutional invasion of privacy when applied to require disclosure of docu-
ments that private parties, between themselves, had agreed to keep
secret."0
Byron Harless was a management consulting firm hired by JEA to
conduct the first phase of a nationwide search for a new executive di-
rector."' Byron Harless advertised nationally, took applications, and
screened them for the JEA. 2 At some point, Byron Harless was to turn
over to the JEA a report naming one or a few finalists. At that time the
report became a public record. Counsel for the JEA advised that Byron
Harless's records were not public records.33 The identities of those ap-
plicants who did not become finalists would never have to be made pub-
any or all the documents of a private actor, as in the case of the example cited in note
11. If the advisor to a private-sector actor determines that it is in possession of public
records, the next step is to determine if any or all of them are exempt from disclosure
under Chapter 119. At that point in the inquiry, the most concise source of exemptions
is the well-indexed Government-In-the-Sunshine Manual. See supra note 19. Also, gov-
ernment lawyers are normally familiar with the statutory exemptions dealing with their
particular agency or field of specialty.
26. FLA. STAT. § 110.011(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
27. Id. § 119.011(2) (1991) (emphasis added).
28. See Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 87-88.
29. 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
30. Id. at 635.
31. Id. at 634-35.
32. Id. at 635.
33. Id.
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lic; and as to the finalists, extensive information would remain in the
private files of Byron Harless.3'
In the meantime, applicants were assured of confidentiality until,
and unless, they eventually became finalists. Even then, the extremely
personal information used by Byron Harless to evaluate the candidates,
but not turned over to the JEA, would never become public. Richard
Roe was but one of several candidates who said they would suffer "dire
consequences" if this confidentiality were breached.35
A Jacksonville television executive sought, and was denied, Byron
Harless's records. He was joined by then Attorney General Shevin in
suing for the disclosure of the records under Chapter 119. Byron
Harless and some of the persons secretly identified in Byron Harless's
files asserted a right of privacy under the state and federal constitu-
tions. Chapter 119, they said, was unconstitutional to the extent that it
required the release of their identities and certain other private infor-
mation about them in Byron Harless's records."
The Supreme Court of Florida, reversing the First District Court
of Appeal, found first that the persons named in public records do not
have a state or federal right to privacy that is violated by the release of
public records.3 7 Next, the supreme court refined the definition of
"records," 38 which the first district had defined too expansively.
But the supreme court accepted, and thus ratified without discus-
sion, the first district's conclusion that Byron Harless was "acting on
behalf of" a public agency. 39 On that point, the appellate court's ruling
said:
A business entity such as the consultant must be regarded as "act-
ing on behalf of" the public agency if the services contracted for
are an integral part of the agency's chosen process for a decision on
the question at hand . . . .Because the consultant was employed
to perform and did perform a preliminary search and inquiry func-
tion which JEA thought necessary or desirable for its proper deci-
34. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 87.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 85-87.
37. Byron Harless, 379 So. 2d at 638-39.
38. Id. at 640. A "record" includes any materials "intended to perpetuate, com-
municate, or formalize knowledge of some type," and not their "precursors," such as
notes made by a public official (or, in this case, a Byron Harless employee) purely for
his own use.
39. Id. at 635.
1992] 1235
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sion, the consultant was "acting on behalf of" JEA and was there-
for an "agency" to which the public records law applied.40
In other contexts, this quote provides little guidance about when
the private sector is "acting on behalf of" a state agency. Whether the
private party is "acting on behalf of" the public agency depends on
how "integral" the private party's role is in the public agency's deci-
sion-making process, but what facts would make a consulting firm's
role more "integral" to the decision-making process, and thus surely
covered by the Public Records Law, or less "integral," and thus more
likely to not be covered by the Public Records Law?
Some guidance might be derived from a case on the application of
the Government-in-the-Sunshine Law, Chapter 286, Florida Statutes,
which requires collegial boards and commissions to give notice of their
meetings and open them to the public. The supreme court has stated
that the Sunshine Law and the Public Records Act are "closely related
in purpose and policy," and case law on one sometimes sheds light on
the other.41 In a Sunshine Law case, Wood v. Marston,"2 the supreme
court required a faculty committee screening candidates for a Univer-
sity of Florida dean's post to meet in the open because of its "undis-
puted decision-making function in screening the applicants. In deciding
which of the applicants to reject from further consideration, the com-
mittee performed a policy-based, decision-making function delegated to
it by the president of the university . . . .
In Wood v. Marston, the committee would have to meet in the
open even though the president or a faculty committee could in effect
ignore its decisions by selecting a candidate from those eliminated by
the committee. The committee is covered by the open-government law
because, if the president or faculty were to accept the committee's rec-
ommendations, then the process by which some candidates were elimi-
nated would never have been scrutinized publicly.4 The policy choice
to eliminate candidates would have been made in a closed session.
This analysis sheds light on whether a hired consultant's activities
are an "integral" part of the decision-making process. If the consult-
ant's activities could (even if they would not necessarily) foreclose JEA
40. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 88 (citation omitted).
41. Wood v. Marston, 442 So. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 1983).
42. Id. at 934.
43. Id. at 938.
44. Id. at 939.
1236 [Vol. 16
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from further considering the candidates eliminated by Byron Harless,
or limit the information JEA has about its candidates, then policy-
making choices have been delegated to Byron Harless. This would be
why Byron Harless's activities for the JEA are an "integral" part of
the decision-making process by which JEA chose its director. With less
influence over JEA's consideration of information and screening of can-
didates, Byron Harless would be less likely to be covered by the Public
Records Law.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW SINCE BYRON HARLESS
The shortcoming of the Byron Harless analysis is that it helps to
define "acting on behalf of" only in limited contexts. The analysis may
be extended to a school board's screening of multiple sites for a new
school,48 for instance, or any other type of outsider-assisted process of
screening many options down to a few. Still, it helps only to define
when a. private actor is making a decision "on behalf of" a state
agency. What other types of acting "on behalf of" a state agency
might there be?
A. An Easy Case: Attorneys
An attorney representing a public agency is a relatively clear case
of a private party "acting on behalf of" the agency.46 Since the attor-
ney is the client's stand-in for purposes of the representation, the con-
clusion seems compelled that he is "acting on behalf of" the agency.
That a staff attorney's documents are public records is obvious; what is
less obvious, but no less true, is that the records of an attorney in pri-
vate practice pertaining to his representation of a state agency in litiga-
tion or negotiation are public records also.
This conclusion may run counter to the intuition of a private law-
yer, accustomed, as he is, to the notion that his files are made confiden-
tial by ethics, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product doc-
trine.'7 Nonetheless, the confidentiality of an attorney's papers in all
45. Cf. News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural
Group, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), affid, 17 Fla. L. Weekly
S156 (1992) (No. 77,131).
46. See Jim Smith, The Public Records Law and the Sunshine Law. No Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Per Se, and Limited Attorney Work Product Exemption, 14 STET-
SON L. REv. 493 (1985) (authored by the then-attorney general of Florida).
47. Smith, supra note 46. Smith says there is no attorney client privilege "per
1992] 1237
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these doctrines is one running to the client, not the lawyer. The client
of a lawyer working for a government agency is the people; the expres-
sion of those peoples' will can be made only by the legislature; and the
legislature has waived any attorney-client privilege or work-product ex-
emption by enacting Chapter 119. There are several exemptions to
Chapter 119, narrowly crafted and limited in duration, to protect cer-
tain secrets when their release could damage an agency's position in
litigation4 8 or negotiation."9
B. The "Totality of Factors" Test
Another test for gleaning when a private actor is "acting on behalf
of" an agency, found in Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire
Department,50 has come to be called the "totality of factors test.151 In
Schwartzman, community volunteers organized a nonprofit corporation
to operate the county-owned fire fighting equipment. The corporation
received $850 a month in tax money; the county paid for all supplies
and equipment and owned the fire station property; and all county
funds were placed in the same bank accounts with money the corpora-
tion obtained in such fund-raising activities as fish frys.52 The court
held that the "totality" of these facts led "irresistibly to the conclusion
that this department is subject to the Public Records Act."153
se," and a "limited" attorney work-product doctrine, because there are narrowly fo-
cused exceptions to the Public Records Act resembling the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine. To this author, it seems more logical to say that the Public
Records Act waives any attorney-client privilege or work product exemption in behalf
of the public, but that certain documents may be withheld from the public, not under
an attorney-client privilege or work product exemption, but under exemptions to the
Public Records Act. See Edelstein v. Donner, 450 So. 2d 562, 562 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (referring to "a non-existent work product exemption to the Public Records
Act"). Either view obtains the same result by different semantics.
48. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(n) (1991) (work product exemption no longer
applies when litigation ends).
49. E.g., id. at (3)(p) (appraisals of real property sought by an agency by
purchase or eminent domain exempt from disclosure until conditional acceptance of a
contract for sale).
50. 352 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.
2d 132 (Fla. 1978).
51. The name "totality of factors test," was first used in Sarasota Herald-Trib-
une Co. v. Community Health Corp., 582 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
52. Schwartzman, 352 So. 2d at 1230.
53. Id. at 1232.
1238 [Vol. 16
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The court held that if certain private-sector entities pass the total-
ity of factors test, all of their documents become public records."' It is
not clear why this is so. Under the logic of Byron Harless, only those
records pertaining to an activity carried out "on behalf of" the county
would be public records. Suppose the Merritt Island volunteers engaged
in some activities that were not on behalf of the county. If they organ-
ized a fish fry to contribute money to help an accident victim, they
might generate planning memoranda, correspondence with the victim's
family, tickets, contracts with vendors and other documents. Why
should these be public records if the volunteers are not acting on behalf
of the county for purposes of the charity drive?
The court must have meant that everything the volunteers under-
take is "on behalf of" the county because the entity would not exist
were it not for the county; none of its activities could be segregated
from the county's contribution of money and property. If so, the total-
ity of factors test can be understood to apply when so much of an en-
tity's money and property comes from an agency that it would not exist
were it not for the agency. Then, every document is a public record.
This would not be inconsistent with Byron Harless; it would sim-
ply deal with a set of circumstances in which the Byron Harless analy-
sis would not be helpful. The Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Depart-
ment was not assisting the county in the type of decision-making
process to which Byron Harless applies; instead, it was deemed to be
totally a creature of the government.
C. Another Test: The Essential Governmental Function
In Fox v. News-Press Publishing Co.,55 the totality test was ap-
plied in a manner so different that it really is not the same test at all.
Fox had entered into a contract to tow wrecked and abandoned vehicles
from public streets and property.56 Concluding, ostensibly based on
Schwartzman, that the documents generated in carrying out Fox's con-
tract with the city were "public records," the Second District Court of
Appeal said:
54. Id. The totality test was followed in Tribune Co. v. Palm River Volunteer
Fire Department, 7 Fla. Supp. 2d 32 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1984), although the Palm
River volunteers received no direct cash operating subsidy from the county. Thus, the
totality need not be quite as total as was the case in Schwartzman.
55. 545 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
56. Id. at 943.
19921 1239
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While there is no one factor that determines when records of a
private business under contract with a public entity fall within the
purview of the public records law, a totality of factors which indi-
cate a significant level of involvement by the public entity, such as
the City in this instance, can lead to the conclusion that the records
are subject to the Public Records Act . 7
The court looked to the fact that the vehicles were being towed
away pursuant to city ordinances enacted under the city's police pow-
ers. The contract called for the city police to have extensive control
over the towing activities. Therefore, the court concluded, the totality
of factors involved in the contract showed that the contractor was
"clearly performing what is essentially a governmental function."58
In Schwartzman, the totality of factors pointed to the totality of
the volunteer fire department's dependence on the government for its
existence, and led to the conclusion that all its records were public. In
Fox, a totality of factors pointed to whether the particular contract was
one to perform an "essentially governmental function," and only the
documents related to that function were deemed public records. Fox, in
reality, did not depend on Schwartzman, but created a new test: an
"essentially governmental function" test to determine if a particular ac-
tivity undertaken by a private entity is one in which the entity is "act-
ing on behalf of" a public agency to perform the agency's functions.
Reversing the facts in Fox and Schwartzman illustrates that the
tests they use are not the same. Applying the Fox analysis to
Schwartzman would require looking to a totality of factors involved in
operating a volunteer fire department to determine if that activity was
an "essentially governmental function." The Schwartzman court did
not do that. The Schwartzman court applied the totality test to deter-
mine if the entity was a totally governmental entity. One test looks to
the entity; the other, to the function. The Schwartzman test would find
an entity covered by Chapter 119 if the entity were funded and main-
tained by the government, regardless of whether a particular function
being undertaken by the entity was an "essentially governmental
function."
The totality of factors test was applied in Sarasota Herald-Trib-
une Co. v. Community Health Corp.59 There, the Second District
57. Id. (citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. 582 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Court of Appeal found Fox and Schwartzman to be consistent and pur-
ported to apply both of them60 without recognizing the difference in
their approaches. In reality, however, the court applied the Schwartz-
man approach.
In Sarasota Herald-Tribune, a private, not-for-profit corporation
was created by a local Public Hospital Board to carry out many of the
functions of the hospital tax district. 1 In applying the totality of fac-
tors test, the second district thoughtfully weighed the not-for-profit cor-
poration's creation and existence, funding and capitalization, goals,
purposes, ownership and interdependence with the local hospital taxing
district.62 Note that all these factors look to the character of the not-
for-profit company, not to the character of the function being carried
out by the company. Concluding that the not-for-profit corporation ex-
isted basically as a creature of the public hospital agency, the second
district declared the not-for-profit company's records to be public
records under Chapter 119.1'
This reasoning and result would be consistent with Schwartzman,
but the second district went one step further-and it was a step more
consistent with Fox than with Schwartzman. The court said that if any
particular function of the not-for-profit corporation were found not to
be "performed on behalf of" the hospital board, the records related to
that particular function would not be subject to mandatory disclosure
under Chapter 119.4
This latter dictum contradicts Schwartzman and, indeed, the en-
tire Sarasota Herald Tribune analysis. The court, in accord with
Schwartzman, analyzed the characteristics of the corporation itself to
find the corporation covered by Chapter 119. It did not look to whether
operating a hospital is an "essentially governmental function," as the
Fox court would.
D. Confusion Among the Cases on Contracts with Agencies
Fox's "essentially governmental function" analysis attempts to
provide some guidance as to when a business enterprise that enters into
a contract to provide goods or services to a public agency is "acting on
60. Id.
61. Id. at 732.
62. Id. at 734.
63. Id.
64. Sarasota Herald-Tribune Co., 582 So. 2d at 734.
1992] 1241
13
Rivas: Access To "Private" Documents Under the Public Records Act
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
behalf of" the agency, and thus subject to Chapter 119 as to that func-
tion. 5 Other cases, however, show how unworkable the "essentially
governmental function" test can be under different circumstances.
In Fritz v. Norflor Construction Co.,66 an engineering firm was
held to be "acting on behalf of" a city when it served as city engineer
in the construction of a wastewater treatment facility." Throughout
the court's opinion there was no mention as to how or why this type of
contract, to provide a city with professional services, brought the engi-
neers under the Public Records Act.
In contrast, Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade
County"' found that none of three private-sector companies were "act-
ing on behalf of" Dade County "merely by contracting with a govern-
mental agency." 69 The three included the contractor of a solid waste
facility, a firm that contracted to manage and operate the facility upon
its completion, and a firm that guaranteed the obligations of the other
two. The court, in Parsons & Whittemore, cited to Fritz for the pro-
position that "entities which perform an essentially governmental func-
tion come within the purview of section 119.011(2) only as to those
functions which are performed in that capacity." '
Having acknowledged the governmental function test, the Parsons
& Whittemore court said it was "unaware of any authority which sup-
ports the proposition that merely by contracting with a governmental
agency a corporation 'acts on behalf of' the agency."71 This method of
distinguishing Fritz does not explain why the engineering firm in Fritz
had not "merely" contracted with the city to provide engineering ser-
vices. Parsons & Whittemore might be understood to stand for the pro-
position that acting as the city engineer on a construction project is an
"essentially governmental function." This might be a logical conclusion
because cities often have a person on their staff who is nominally the
"city engineer." However, if that is what the court meant, it did not
say so.
Furthermore, Parsons & Whittemore did not separately explain
why any one of the three corporations was individually distinguishable
65. See Fox, 545 So. 2d at 941.
66. 386 So. 2d 899, (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
67. Id. at 901.
68. 429 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
69. Id. at 346.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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from the subject of the public records request in Fritz. One could say it
is an "essentially governmental function" to build a waste water treat-
ment plant since the private sector does not. On the other hand, one
might say the contractor was not engaged in an "essentially govern-
mental function" since governments normally do not undertake con-
struction projects themselves, but hire contractors instead. It is far
harder to explain why the firm that was to manage the waste water
treatment plant was not engaged in an "essentially governmental
function. ' 72
E. The Florida Supreme Court's Latest Venture Into the Field
Even more difficult to distinguish from the engineering firm in
Fritz is the architectural firm in.News & Sun Sentinel Co. v. Schwab,
Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc. .73 There, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that an architect hired by a school board to
design a school was not within Chapter 119.74
In affirming, the Supreme Court of Florida claimed that the dis-
trict courts of appeal "generally have made the determination" of
whether a private entity's records are covered by Chapter 119 "based
on the 'totality of factors.'"-7 The supreme court thus pushed all the
conflicting cases on "acting on behalf of" a public agency under one
giant umbrella. Without mentioning Fritz, the supreme court described
the Schwartzman "totality of factors" test and the Fox "essential gov-
ernmental function" test as if they were on and the same."
Sarasota Herald Tribune and Parsons & Whittemore were cited
72. The Parsons & Whittemore opinion noted that the management firm was to
manage the waste water treatment facility "upon its completion and purchase by the
county, but the county has not yet purchased the plant." Id. at 345. In State ex rel.
Florida Publishing Co. v. Kinard, 14 Fla. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. 1985), a
trial court interpreted this fact as explaining why the contractor was not "acting on
behalf or' the county. It does not help explain why the management firm was not
performing an essentially governmental function in the third district's view. If manag-
ing the facility were an "essentially governmental function," and the management firm
was already engaged in activities preparatory to managing the facility, why would the
management firm not already be "acting in behalf or' Dade County for purposes of
the Public Records Act?
73. 570 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), affid, 17 Fla. L. Weekly
S156 (March 5, 1992) (No. 77,131).
74. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 570 So. 2d at 1096.
75. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 17 Fla. L. Weekly at S157.
76. Id.
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in further support of the concept of a single "totality of factors" test.
Byron, Harless's analysis of whether a private entity played an "inte-
gral part" in a decision-making process became not a separate test
designed for the unique situation of a decision-making process, but a
"factor" within the supreme court's super-totality of factors test.7 By
seeming to endorse the outcomes of so many of the district court cases,
News & Sun Sentinel Co. seems to have left all their inconsistencies
intact.
F. The Special Case of the Private Records-Keeper
At least one attempt by a private party to keep its business with
the government private reached the point of being tragicomical. In
Times Publishing Co. v. City of St. Petersburg8 [hereinafter
"Chisox"], the city and the Chicago White Sox commenced negotia-
tions for the White Sox (represented by Chisox Corp., an appellee/
cross appellant) to play in St. Petersburg's Suncoast Dome. Because of
politics in their home state, the White Sox required confidentiality con-
cerning the existence of the discussions and the city assured them it
would try to oblige.
Under a plan worked out by the city attorney and Chisox Corp.,
the city agreed never to take physical possession of any correspondence
or draft contracts.7 9 The city attorney took a five-inch stack of notes on
the drafts. He felt that his notes were not public records because they
were merely his own personal "precursors" to public records.8" Armed
with his notes, he shuttled back and forth between city officials and
Chisox Corp. as the negotiations proceeded, yet nobody from the city
ever took possession of any documents, wrote Chisox any letters or
wrote themselves any memoranda. 8' To illustrate the sham character of
this arrangement, it is worth quoting at length from a letter Chisox
sent to the city. The city attorney helped draft the letter as part of his
77. Id.
78. 558 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
79. Id.
80. Id. Whether the city attorney's notes were in fact mere "precursors" and not
public records was never resolved in Chisox for procedural reasons. Id. at 491-92. It
seems clear, however, that some or all of the notes were not "precursors" but were
subject to mandatory disclosure as public records because they were written to "perpet-
uate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type," despite the city attorney's
effort to create a fiction to the contrary. Byron Harless, 379 So. 2d at 640.
81. See Times Publishing Co., 558 So. 2d at 489-95.
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participation in the secrecy arrangements.
'This letter is provided to you in conjunction with a proposed draft
Stadium Lease Agreement dated April 27, 1988 between Chicago
White Sox, Ltd. and the City of St. Petersburg. While you are
authorized to examine this document in your office, this document
is not to leave your possession. You are not authorized to receive,
possess, or copy this document. This document is not to come into
your possession or custody and is not transmitted to you.82
In the text of a letter transmitted to the city, and in the possession
and custody of the city, the letter declared itself not to have been trans-
mitted to the city and not to be in the possession and custody of the
city. This was like all the members of the White Sox pointing to a
baseball, declaring it to be a catcher's mitt and agreeing to speak about
the thing for the rest of the day as if it were a catcher's mitt. Unfortu-
nately for the city the local appellate court insisted on calling a base-
ball a baseball.
The court ruled that many of the documents possessed by Chisox
were really owned by the city and were merely left in the possession of
Chisox to evade the Public Records Act.83 Therefore, Chisox was "act-
ing on behalf of" the city as the custodian of the city's records. From
this emerges the most unusual definition of "acting on behalf of" an
agency: A private entity "acting on behalf of" a city as its records-
keeper.
Only two years earlier, in News-Press Publishing Co. v. Kaune,8"
the same court passed up an opportunity to create the records-keeper
concept. Dr. Centafont was hired by the city to perform drug screening
of the city's firefighters.8 5 He kept the records, but, if a firefighter's
blood or urine sample showed drug use, he was to take the results to
the fire chief, show them to him, and then keep physical possession of
the documents so that they would not become public record as part of
82. Id. at 489-90.
83. Id. at 492. Interestingly, a provision of Iowa's public records law would have
made the second district's result easier to reach: "A government body shall not prevent
the examination or copying of a public record by contracting with a nongovernmental
body to perform any of its duties or functions." KMEG Television, Inc. v. Iowa State
Bd. of Regents, 440 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Iowa 1989) (citing IOWA CODE § 22.2(2)
(1987)).
84. 511 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
85. Id. at 1024.
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the firefighter's personnel file.8
The second district found Dr. Centafont's records not to be public
records even though the city paid for them, they were about city em-
ployees, and they were showed to the fire chief to transmit information
to the chief that the city was entitled to receive so that he could act on
the information to remove, discipline or assist a firefighter. 87 After
reading Chisox, it is impossible to explain why Dr. Centafont was not
acting as the records-keeper for the city. Perhaps the court felt sympa-
thy for the traditional notion that medical records are confidential. If
so, the court could have kept the records secret by an expedient that
would not have cast an analytically unsound gloss on the definition of
"acting on behalf of" an agency. The medical records in Kaune were
exempt from disclosure under a specific exemption from the Public
Records Act's disclosure requirement. The court even so held.88
The fire chief, therefore, could have kept them in his office and
kept them secret. The court could have ruled simply that the docu-
ments were exempt from disclosure even if they were public records.
Perhaps the dictum that the documents were not public records should
be ignored. Perhaps it is bad law after Chisox.
G. The Trade Mission Exception To "Acting On Behalf Of'
News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Modesitt89 illustrates well the unpre-
dictable variety of contexts in which "acting on behalf of" might have
to be defined. The records of the Florida Agricultural Trade Mission
Group, which organized many private-sector agricultural interests for
trade missions abroad, 90 were sought under the Public Records Act.
Although the agriculture commissioner's own expenses on the trade
missions were paid by the state, he served as custodian of funds con-
tributed by the private interests to pay their expenses.91 He used his
position to secure cooperation from the U.S. federal officials and those
of foreign governments to make the trade missions a success. 92
The First District Court of Appeal said the records were "clearly"
not public because the commissioner acted only as custodian of private
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1026.
89. 466 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1165 (Wentworth, J., dissenting).
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funds.9" It is not clear why the public versus private character of the
funds was controlling; in Schwartzman, private funds donated to the
Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Department became subject to the Pub-
lic Records Act because of the character of the entity.94
Schwartzman would require an inquiry into whether the Trade
Mission Group owes its existence to the agriculture commissioner, yet
Modesitt did not discuss whether the Trade Mission Group was acting
on behalf of the state. If the Trade Mission Group were not acting on
behalf of the state, the question is begged: Why did these private
agribusiness firms turn their money over to the commissioner as custo-
dian? They presumably wanted to be the Official State of Florida
Trade Mission Group, which would mean they wanted to be seen as a
state agency or be a quasi-public entity. Instead, the court saw the
commissioner as a state official acting on behalf of the private sector.
This case, in sum, does not fit into the analytic framework of any other
case defining "agency" or "acting on behalf of" under Chapter 119. In
fact, it contains no reference to any of the "acting on behalf of" cases
cited in this article, or even to any particular subsection of Chapter
119.
V. CONCLUSION
Countless businesses are engaged in contracts to perform services
or provide goods to government agencies, and countless other entities
are involved with government, spending its money, taking over its ser-
vices, performing its functions. Perhaps the courts of Florida have not
intelligibly defined when such private actors are "acting on behalf of' a
public agency for purposes of Chapter 119 because of the infinite vari-
ety of potential factual settings in which government and the private
sector work together.
For whatever reason, the decisions on this question in Florida are
inconsistent and irreconcilable. They leave the public unable to predict,
except in a few clear circumstances, whether records generated by a
private actor will be subject to mandatory public disclosure.
93. Id. at 1164.
94. See Schwartzman, 352 So. 2d at 1232.
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